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Abstract Magri (2009b,a, 2011) argues that scalar implicatures are blind to any
contextual information. Schlenker (2012: sections 3 and 4) objects that contextual
Blindness is too strong an assumption because of the contextually ordered alterna-
tives documented in Hirschberg (1991). He thus submits that the computation of
scalar implicatures is not blind but just contextually “short-sighted”: it can ignore
certain pieces of common knowledge, but it is not required to ignore all of it. In this
paper, I show that Schlenker’s proposal is a technical mistake: Short-sightedness is
provably equivalent to Blindness under natural assumptions on the set of scalar alter-
natives. Short-sightedness thus provides no new ammunitions against Hirschberg’s
challenge. I then take a closer look at the challenge, through some initial evidence
that contextually ordered alternatives are restricted and dependent on specific lexical
choices. I conjecture that these choices share the property of introducing more
logical structure than meets the eye, thus possibly providing the logical ordering
required by Blindness (or the equivalent Short-sightedness). If this conjecture turns
out to be correct, contextual ordering is never relevant to scalar implicatures, as
indeed predicted by Blindness (or the equivalent Short-sightedness).
Keywords: scalar implicatures; oddness; contextually ordered alternatives; Gricean reason-
ing; common knowledge.
1 Introduction
In earlier work (Magri 2009b,a, 2011), I have defended an account for the oddness
of sentence (1a) based on the following intuition. Just like any other existentially
quantified sentence, this sentence (1a) triggers the scalar implicature that the uni-
versally quantified alternative (1b) is false, namely that not all Italians come from
a warm country. Yet, common knowledge entails that all Italians come from the
same country, rendering the existentially and universally quantified alternatives
* I would like to thank Gennaro Chierchia, Danny Fox, Salvatore Pistoia-Reda, Paolo Santorio, and
Philippe Schlenker for useful comments. The paper also benefitted from comments and discussion at
the Exhaustivity Workshop held at MIT on September 10th 2016.
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contextually equivalent. In conclusion, the oddness of sentence (1a) follows from a
mismatch between the scalar implicature and common knowledge.
(1) a. #Some Italians come from a warm country.
b. (All) Italians come from a warm country.
The formalization of this intuition runs into the following difficulty. Suppose that
the algorithm for the computation of scalar implicatures had access to the common
knowledge that all Italians come from the same country and thus to the information
that the two alternatives (1a) and (1b) are contextually equivalent. No currently avail-
able implementation of that algorithm would then be able to derive the mismatching
implicature needed to account for the oddness of sentence (1a). In my earlier work,
I took this fact at face value and interpreted the oddness of sentence (1a) as evidence
that the algorithm for the computation of scalar implicatures must be purely logical,
namely blind to common knowledge. Section 2 reviews this Blindness hypothesis.
Schlenker (2012: sections 3 and 4)1 submits that Hirschberg’s (1991) contex-
tually ordered alternatives raise a challenge to Blindness. This challenge can be
previewed as follows. Sentence (43a) triggers the scalar implicature that Mary
dropped out of school after high school, namely that the alternative (43b) is false.
Sentence (43b) instead does not trigger the scalar implicature that the alternative
(43a) is false, as the sentence would otherwise mismatch with the piece of common
knowledge that a college degree presupposes a high school degree.
(2) a. Mary has a high school degree.
b. Mary has a college degree.
It is tempting to correlate this asymmetry in scalar behavior with the fact that (43b)
asymmetrically entails (43a). Yet, this entailment is contextual (it follows from
common knowledge of the school system), not logical. In conclusion, such cases of
contextually ordered alternatives seem to challenge the hypothesis that implicatures
are blind to common knowledge and only sensitive to purely logical entailment.
Section 3 reviews this challenge.
Schlenker thus suggests that the Blindness hypothesis is wrong and needs to
be weakened. He puts forward a more moderate hypothesis: scalar implicatures
are allowed to ignore certain pieces of common knowledge, as needed to derive
the oddness of sentence (1a); yet, they are crucially not required to be blind to the
entire common knowledge, thus possibly accommodating the common knowledge
required to account for (43). Let me dub Schlenker’s alternative proposal contextual
1 This paper is only concerned with the second part of Schlenker’s paper (sections 3 and 4), not
with the analysis of Maximize Presupposition developed in the first part (sections 1 and 2) of his
paper—-although my critical assessment of his principle of Fallibility in section 5 below extends to
the first part of Schlenker’s paper.
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Short-sightedness. Section 4 shows that Schlenker’s Short-sightedness is actually
provably equivalent to Blindness under natural assumptions on the set of scalar
alternatives. I conclude that Schlenker’s proposal is a technical mistake: Short-
sightedness provides no new ammunitions against the challenge of contextually
ordered alternatives and it is indeed a notational variant of Blindness.
Although Blindness and Short-sightedness are notational variants of each other,
Schlenker submits that Short-sightedness has the advantage of being compatible
with Gricean reasoning through a new pragmatic principle that he calls Fallibility.
Section 5 reviews Schlenker’s principle of Fallibility, briefly elaborates on the notion
of “Griceanizability”, and questions the Gricean credentials of Short-sightedness.
Furthermore, I note that the challenge raised by contextually ordered alternatives
extends to the (plain) meaning of sentences with only, whose interpretation ought
to be hardwired in the semantics of the only operator and is thus independent of
principles of Gricean pragmatics.
Section 6 takes a closer look at the challenge against Blindness (or, for that
matter, the equivalent Short-sightedness) raised by Hirschberg’s contextually or-
dered alternatives. If scalar implicatures had free access to contextual information,
contextually ordered alternatives would be predicted to be freely available though
proper manipulations of the common knowledge. Instead, I provide some initial
evidence that contextually ordered alternatives are heavily restricted and dependent
on specific lexical choices. I conjecture that these specific lexical choices share the
property of introducing more logical structure than meets the eye, possibly providing
the logical ordering required by Blindness (or Short-sightedness). For instance,
sentence (43a) admits a degree construal whereby it says that Mary has a degree
of education which is equal to or larger than the degree which corresponds to high
school. Under this construal, its scalar implicature simply negates that she has a
degree of education larger than that. The entailment between the base sentence
and the negated alternative is purely logical, based on the ordering of degrees (of
education). Under this analysis, the derivation of the implicature needs to know
nothing about mundane facts concerning high schools and colleges. I conclude in
section 7 with the conjecture that contextual ordering never plays any role in scalar
behavior, as indeed predicted by Blindness (or the equivalent Short-sightedness).
2 Blindness
Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 sketch a framework for the description of scalar implicatures
and thus set the background for the rest of the paper. Subsections 2.3 and 2.4 then
summarize the Blindness hypothesis that was argued in Magri (2009b,a, 2011) to be
needed to formalize the intuition that a sentence such as (1a) sounds odd because of
the scalar implicature that not all Italians come from a warm country.
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2.1 Strengthened meaning
Let me denote by [[[j]]]c the strengthened meaning of a base sentence j relative to
the common knowledge c available in the context of utterance, namely the plain
meaning of j enriched with the scalar implicatures triggered by j in a context
characterized by the common knowledge c.2 The crucial role played by common
knowledge in what follows is explicitly recognized right from the outset, by letting it
figure as a parameter c in the definition of the strengthened meaning.3 To illustrate,
the base sentence jmost in (3a) triggers the scalar implicature that John stopped short
of doing the entire homework. Equivalently, it triggers the implicature ¬yall that
the alternative yall in (3b) is false. Hence, the strengthened meaning [[[jmost]]]c of
the base sentence jmost is the conjunction of jmost with the negation ¬yall of the
alternative yall, as indicated in (3).4
(3) [[[jmost]]]c = jmost^¬yall
a. John did most of the homework. = jmost
b. John did all of the homework. = yall
c. John did some of the homework. = ysome
In general, the strengthened meaning [[[j]]]c of a base sentence j is described as
the conjunction of the plain meaning of j with the negation of a bunch of alternatives
y1,y2, . . . , as in (4a). It is convenient to collect all these excluded alternatives in a
set usually denoted by Exclc(j), as in (4b). The dependence of the strengthened
meaning [[[·]]]c on the common knowledge c percolates down to the set Exclc(·) of
excluded alternatives.
(4) [[[j]]]c (a)= j ^¬y1^¬y2^ . . . (b)= j ^
^
y2Exclc(j)
¬y
The issue of the proper description of the strengthened meaning [[[j]]]c thus
boils down to the issue of the proper description of the set Exclc(j) of excluded
alternatives (relative to the common knowledge c). The latter issue is delicate. To
illustrate, the alternative yall in (3b) must belong to the set Exclc(jmost), in order
to derive the intended strengthened meaning. Yet, the alternative ysome in (3c)
cannot belong to the set Exclc(jmost), as the strengthened meaning of jmost would
otherwise be condemned to be a contradiction. What is the relevant difference
2 The term strengthened meaning is non-committal relative to the debate concerning the pragmatic
versus grammatical nature of scalar implicatures (Horn 2005; Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012).
3 I assume that c is the set of possible worlds consistent with the common knowledge currently available
in the context of utterance. Since the examples considered throughout the paper are all elementary,
this parameter c will never be used in the plain semantics. It will only be relevant for the definition of
the excluded alternatives; see (5) and (6) below.
4 With abuse of notation, I use the same symbol j,y, . . . for both a sentence and its plain meaning.
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between these two alternatives yall and ysome that can be exploited in the definition
of the set Exclc(jmost) of excluded alternatives? Two answers have been explored in
the literature, summarized in the next subsection. This discussion will be relevant
for the developments in subsection 4.2.
2.2 Excluded alternatives
One characterization of the set of excluded alternatives follows from the logics of the
(neo)-Gricean approach to scalar implicatures (Horn 1972; Geurts 2010). According
to this approach, a scalar implicature arises through the comparison of the speaker’s
utterance j with an alternative y that the speaker could have uttered instead and that
would have counted as a “better” utterance. If conversation is construed as a game
that maximizes information exchange between speaker and addressee, y counts as
“better” than j in case y would have provided more information than j , namely y
asymmetrically entails j . This line of reasoning leads to the definition (5) of the set
Exclc(j) of excluded alternatives.
(5) Exclc(j) consists of those scalar alternatives y of j such that y asymmet-
rically entails j relative to c, namely y \c( j \c .
According to this approach, the relevant difference between the two alternatives yall
and ysome in (3) is that only the former asymmetrically entails ymost, so that only the
former ends up in the corresponding set Exclc(ymost) of excluded alternatives.
An alternative characterization of the set of excluded alternatives has been
endorsed within the grammatical approach to scalar implicatures (Chierchia 2004;
Chierchia et al. 2012; Spector to appear). According to this approach, implicatures
are derived not through pragmatic, extra-grammatical reasoning, but through a
syntactically realized covert operator akin to only (I will come back to this point
in subsection 2.4). From this perspective, excluded alternatives don’t need to be
“better” than the base sentence, as long as they are not “harmful”. More precisely,
excluded alternatives do not need to asymmetrically entail the base sentence. Instead,
it suffices that their negation does not contradict the base sentence, leading to the
definition (6) of the set Exclc(j) of excluded alternatives.5
5 More precisely, it suffices that excluded alternatives do not yield a contradictory strengthened
meaning [[[j]]]c. Condition (6), as it stands, does not ensure that. In fact, suppose that j comes
with two alternatives y1 and y2 whose negation does not contradict j , namely j \ c\¬y1 6= /0
and j \c\¬y2 6= /0. Hence, both y1 and y2 belong to the corresponding set Exclc(j) of excluded
alternatives according to definition (6). Yet, the strengthened meaning [[[j]]]c = j ^¬y1^¬y2 could
still be a contradiction, namely it could still happen that j \c\¬y1\¬y2 = /0. The formulation in
(6) is therefore too weak and it has indeed been carefully refined in the literature in a number of ways
(see Spector to appear for a review). I ignore these refinements because all the cases considered in
this paper involve a unique alternative, so that the refinements considered in the literature turn out to
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(6) Exclc(j) consists of those scalar alternatives y of j such that the negation
of y does not contradict j relative to c, namely j \c\¬y 6= /0 .
According to this approach, the relevant difference between the two alternatives yall
and ysome in (3) is that only the former can be negated without contracting ymost,
so that only the former ends up in the corresponding set Exclc(ymost) of excluded
alternatives.
2.3 Oddness filter
I am now ready to go back to the problem of accounting for the oddness of sentences
such as (1a), repeated as jsome in (7a).
(7) a. #Some Italians come from a warm country. = jsome
b. (All) Italians come from a warm country. = yall
As anticipated, I want to capture the intuition that jsome sounds odd because it
triggers the scalar implicature that the alternative yall in (7b) is false, contradicting
the common knowledge that all Italians come from the same country. I thus need an
oddness filter which takes into account the strengthened meaning, as in (8).
(8) Oddness filter: preliminary formulation.
A sentence j sounds odd relative to the actual common knowledge cactual
provided [[[j]]]c\cactual = /0.
This preliminary formulation (8) of the oddness filter purposely features a free
parameter, namely the common knowledge c used in the computation of the strength-
ened meaning [[[j]]]c of the odd sentence j . A natural choice would be to set this
parameter c equal to the actual common knowledge cactual, yielding the reformulation
(9) of the oddness filter. This formulation is plausibly purely pragmatical. In fact,
the relevant meaning for pragmatics ought to be the strengthened meaning relative
to the actual common knowledge. And it makes sense for pragmatics to require the
relevant meaning of the speaker’s utterance not to be a contextual contradiction. Let
me thus refer to (9) as the vanilla formulation of the oddness filter.
(9) Oddness filter: vanilla formulation.
A sentence j sounds odd relative to the actual common knowledge cactual
provided [[[j]]]c\cactual = /0 where c= cactual .
Unfortunately, this vanilla formulation fails at accounting for the oddness of the
sentence jsome in (7a). In fact, jsome and yall are equivalent relative to the actual
common knowledge cactual (because cactual entails that all Italians come from the
be equivalent to the simplified formulation (6).
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same country). Hence, yall cannot belong to the set Exclcactual(jsome) of alternatives
excluded by jsome relative to the actual common knowledge cactual, no matter which
of the two definitions (5) or (6) of excluded alternatives is adopted. Thus, the
strengthened meaning [[[j]]]cactual computed relative to the actual common knowledge
cactual is not a contextual contradiction.
In Magri (2009b,a, 2011), I took this fact at face value and proposed a reformu-
lation of the oddness filter where the strengthened meaning is computed not relative
to the actual common knowledge cactual but relative to the entire set W of possible
worlds, leading to the revised formulation (10) of the oddness filter. The boxed
condition in (10) says that the strengthened meaning which enters into the oddness
filter is completely blind to any piece of common knowledge. This boxed condition
is thus dubbed Blindness.
(10) Oddness filter: blind formulation.
A sentence j sounds odd relative to the actual common knowledge cactual
provided [[[j]]]c\cactual = /0 where c=W = the set of all possible worlds .
The logical strengthened meaning of the sentence jsome is [[[jsome]]]c=W = jsome^
¬yall, namely the proposition that some but not all Italians come from a warm
country. This proposition is indeed a contextual contradiction, given the common
knowledge that all Italians come from the same country. The blind oddness filter
thus succeeds at predicting oddness. The price to pay is that the pragmatic jus-
tification of the vanilla formulation of the oddness filter does not extend to the
blind reformulation. A different justification is thus needed, sketched in the next
subsection.
2.4 Overt only
The sentence Some Italians come from a warm country in (7a) remains odd when
only is added, as in (11). Plausibly, scalar implicatures are not at stake here. Instead,
it is tempting to derive oddness from the fact that, because of only, this sentence says
that some but not all Italians come from a warm country, which contradicts the piece
of common knowledge that all Italians come from the same country. Let’s formalize
this intuition.
(11) #Only some Italians come from a warm country.
Abstracting away from a number of (hopefully orthogonal) subtleties (Beaver &
Clark 2008), let me assume that only takes a prejacent sentence j and returns its
conjunction with the negation of a bunch of alternatives. Again, it is convenient to
collect these alternatives in a set of excluded alternatives. Fox (2007) observes that
the strengthened meaning of a sentence such as John did most of the homework in
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(3a) can be paraphrased by the variant with only (associating with the scalar item),
namely John only did most of the homework. Hence, the set of excluded alternatives
in the semantics of only plausibly coincides with the set of excluded alternatives in
the definition of the strengthened meaning, yielding (12) in analogy with (4).
(12) [[only]](j) = j ^ ^
y2Exclc(j)
¬y
The semantics of only thus becomes sensitive to the parameter c which enters
into the definition of the set Exclc of excluded alternatives. It would be natural
to set this parameter c in (12) equal to the actual common knowledge cactual. Yet,
this assumption would fail to predict the (plain) meaning of sentence (11) to be a
contextual contradiction, for the by now familiar reason: cactual entails that all Italians
come from the same country and thus prevents the alternative yall from counting as
excludable relative to the prejacent jsome, no matter which definition of excludability
is adopted. I conclude that the knowledge c in the set of excluded alternatives in the
plain semantics (12) of only is different from the actual common knowledge cactual.6
The definition (4) of the strengthened meaning and the semantics (12) for only
are completely analogous, in order to capture the fact that the strengthened meaning
of a sentence can be paraphrased by adding only. Various authors have indeed
suggested that the strengthened meaning is actually brought about through a covert
only, not through pragmatic, extra-grammatical reasoning (Fox 2007; Chierchia
et al. 2012). As we have just seen, the set of excluded alternatives of overt only is
blind to the actual common knowledge cactual—possibly a general property of the
syntax/semantics interface (Fox 2000). It then makes sense to assume the same to be
the case for covert only. The strengthened meaning is therefore blind to common
knowledge and the oddness filter cannot but check the contextual contraddictorinness
of this blind strengthened meaning, as indeed assumed in (10).
3 The challenge raised by contextually ordered scales
Schlenker submits that Hirschberg’s (1991) contextually ordered alternatives are a
challenge for Blindness. Although Schlenker’s specific formulation of the challenge
6 This conclusion is threatened by the following alternative account. Assume instead that the set of
excludable alternatives for only in (12) is computed relative to the actual common knowledge cactual.
Thus, the alternative yall does not belong to the set of excludable alternatives Exclcactual(jsome)
of the prejacent jsome, independently of the definition of excludability. The oddness of sentence
(11) is thus due not to a contextual contradiction but to the fact that only is vacuous because its set
of excluded alternatives is empty. In other words, sentence (11) is ruled out by the same general
constraint that bans the vacuous occurrence of only in a sentence such as #Only every boy arrived.
Yet, this alternative line of explanation fails for cases with multiple alternatives (for the full argument,
see Magri 2011: section 3).
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is moot (subsection 3.1), the challenge is real (subsection 3.2) and will be discussed
in the rest of the paper.
3.1 Contextually equivalent alternatives
Schlenker asks us to consider a scenario where the actual common knowledge cactual
entails the proposition (13a), say because it has been established through some
preceding discourse. The actual common knowledge cactual of course also entails
a wealth of additional information, including the proposition (13b) concerning
typical college admittance requirements. Against this background, Schlenker notes
the oddness contrast in (14). An analogous contrast holds for the corresponding
sentences with overt only.
(13) The actual common knowledge cactual entails:
a. That every employee in my company is either a janitor with no school
degree or else a programmer with a college degree.
b. That a college degree presupposes a high school degree.
...
(14) a. #My colleague Mary has a high school degree. = jhigh-school
b. My colleague Mary has a college degree. = jcollege
Assume that the oddness of sentence jhigh-school in (14a) is due to a mismatch between
the piece of common knowledge (13a) and the scalar implicature ¬jcollege that Mary
lacks a college degree through the strengthened meaning (15a). The computation
of this mismatching implicature must be blind to the piece of common knowledge
(13a). Since Blindness does not make any distinctions among different pieces of
common knowledge, the computation of scalar implicatures is also blind to the
piece of common knowledge (13b). Sentence jcollege in (14b) is therefore incorrectly
predicted to be odd as well, because of a mismatch between the piece of common
knowledge (14b) and the scalar implicature ¬jhigh-school that Mary lacks a high school
degree through the strengthened meaning (15b).
(15) a. [[[jhigh-school]]]W = jhigh-school^¬jcollege requires ignorance of (13a)
b. [[[jcollege]]]W = jcollege^¬jhigh-school requires ignorance of (13b)
In conclusion, the symmetric formalism (15) is unable to capture the oddness
asymmetry in (14). Schlenker (p. 421) diagnoses that “this symmetry problem
cannot be solved without access to contextual knowledge–which seems to contradict
the essence of Magri’s idea of blind implicatures”. But this diagnosis seems to me
flawed. In fact, the crucial property of Schlenker’s example (13)-(14) is that the
two alternatives jhigh-school and jcollege are contextually equivalent in his scenario: in
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every world in cactual, one of the two alternatives is true if and only if the other one is
true as well. Hence, access to common knowledge could hardly help accounting for
the asymmetry in (14) which therefore has nothing to say about Blindness.
3.2 Contextually asymmetrically entailing alternatives
Although Schlenker’s argument (13)-(14) against Blindness is moot, the following
simpler variant does raise a serious challenge. Out of the blue, sentence jhigh school in
(16a) triggers the scalar implicature that Mary dropped out of school after high school
and thus lacks a college degree. That is indeed the meaning of the corresponding
sentence with overt only. In other words, the strengthened meaning of sentence
jhigh school is (16b), which features the negation of the alternative jcollege.
(16) a. Mary has a high school degree. = jhigh school
b. [[[jhigh school]]] = jhigh school^¬jcollege
(17) a. Mary has a college degree. = jcollege
b. [[[jcollege]]] 6= jcollege^¬jhigh school
The case of sentence (17a) is rather different. It does not in any way trigger the scalar
implicature that Mary skipped high school. Indeed, the meaning of the corresponding
sentence with overt only does not in any way single out Mary as an exception to the
standard school system. In other words, the strengthened meaning of sentence jcollege
does not feature the negation of the alternative jhigh school, as indicated in (17b).
What could be responsible for the asymmetry between the two sentences jhigh school
and jcollege displayed in (16)-(17)? It is natural to attribute that asymmetry to the
fact that college presupposes high school. In other words, jcollege asymmetrically
entails jhigh school. This entailment holds relative to common knowledge on the actual
school system. From a logical perspective, no entailment relationship whatsoever
holds between jhigh school and jcollege. These two alternatives are thus an instance
of what Hirschberg (1991) calls contextually ordered alternatives. The obvious
problem for Blindness is that it predicts the scalar behavior of the two alternatives to
track their logical independence rather than their contextual asymmetry. Blindness
thus incorrectly predicts the two alternatives to display a perfectly analogous scalar
behavior: either neither of the two triggers the implicature that the other is false,
whereby jhigh school lacks the attested implicature; or else both alternatives trigger the
implicature that the other is false, whereby jcollege displays an unattested implicature
that should turn it into a contextual contradiction. Hirschberg’s contextually ordered
alternatives defy the very idea of Blindness.
Obviously, no threat against contextual Blindness would arise if the asymmetry
in the scalar behavior of jhigh school and jcollege were to follow from some other
properties than their contextual asymmetric entailment relationship. Indeed, the
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challenge for Blindness only stems from the assumption that it is the contextual
asymmetric entailment that is responsible for the asymmetric scalar behavior. This
assumption leads to the prediction that, if we were to tamper with the out-of-the-blue
common knowledge to the effect of rendering the two alternatives jhigh school and
jcollege contextually equivalent (rather than contextually asymmetrically entailing),
the asymmetry in their scalar behavior should disappear. Schlenker’s example (13)-
(14) is interesting because it shows that this prediction is not borne out. It thus lends
support to the hypothesis that contextual ordering plays no role in the asymmetric
scalar behavior in (16)-(17), as indeed predicted by Blindness. In other words,
Schlenker’s example actually takes some edge off the apparently straightforward
challenge to Blindness raised by Hirschberg’s contextually ordered scales. I will
revisit this issue in subsection 6.2.
3.3 A digression on the contextual nature of the existential import of univer-
sal quantifiers
Schlenker submits that the challenge to Blindness based on contextually ordered
alternatives just reviewed extends to existentially quantified sentences. His starting
point is the observation that “there are examples in which ‘Every P, Q’ does not carry
an implication, let alone a presupposition, that there are P-individuals.” He provides
two such examples and concludes that a universally quantified sentence ‘Every P,
Q’ simply requires P to be a subset of Q, leaving open the possibility that this
subset condition be satisfied through the emptiness of P. Against this background,
Schlenker’s submits that the challenge to Blindness raised by contextually ordered
alternatives re-presents itself with the two alternatives jsome,jall in (19).
(18) The actual common knowledge cactual entails:
a. That all Italians come from the same country.
b. That Italians exist.
...
(19) a. #Some Italians come from a warm country. = jsome
b. (All) Italians come from a warm country. = jall
The sentence jsome in (19a) sounds odd because it triggers the scalar implicature ¬jall
through the strengthened meaning in (20a). The computation of this mismatching
implicature must be blind to the piece of common knowledge (18a). Since Blindness
does not make any distinctions among different pieces of common knowledge, the
computation of scalar implicatures is also blind to the piece of common knowledge
(18b). If the sentence jall in (19b) does not semantically presuppose the existence
of Italians, it can trigger the scalar implicature ¬jsome through the strengthened
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meaning (20b). As Schlenker observes, the conjunction jall^¬jsome thus derived is
equivalent to There exist no Italians. Sentence (19b) is thus incorrectly predicted to
be odd because of a mismatch with the piece of common knowledge (18b).
(20) a. [[[jsome]]]W = jsome^¬jall requires ignorance of (18a)
b. [[[jall]]]W = jall^¬jsome requires ignorance of (18b)
Schlenker submits that the challenge is specific to Blindness because “for standard
[namely non-blind] accounts of implicatures, this observation need not pose a
serious difficulty; they may simply posit that contextual knowledge [such as (18b)]
can be accessed when checking that the pair h‘Some P, Q’, ‘Every P, Q’i stands in
the appropriate relation of asymmetric entailment.”
The presuppositional nature of the existential import of universal quantifiers has
been the subject of a very large literature, with certain authors (such as Russell 1904;
Strawson 1950; Hart 1951; de Jong & Verkuyl 1991; Horn 1997; Geurts 2007) sup-
porting a semantic/presuppositional treatment while others (such as Lappin & Rein-
hart 1988 and Abusch & Rooth 2004) have explored alternative non-presuppositional
approaches. Since Schlenker does not address this literature, it is hard to interpret
his two isolated examples within the context of the larger debate. Be that as it
may, this version of Schlenker’s challenge against Blindness crucially hinges on
the assumption that, in cases such as (19), it is common knowledge (18b) which
crucially provides the correct relationship between the universal and the existential
alternatives. Yet, the contrast in (21) from Pistoia-Reda (to appear) speaks against
this assumption. Common knowledge plausibly does not entail the existence of
Swedish matadors. Indeed, sentence (21b) is judged acceptable but false (in accor-
dance with previous literature; Lappin & Reinhart 1988), precisely because there are
no Swedish matadors in the actual word.
(21) a. #Some Swedish matadors come from a cold country.
b. Some Swedish matadors know Latin
Pistoia-Reda notes that sentence (21a) is instead judged odd, just as the original
sentence (19a). Plausibly, the existentially quantified sentences (19a) and (21a) are
both odd because of the implicature that the corresponding universally quantified
alternative is false. But the analogy breaks down: only common knowledge on
Italians, not the one on Swedish matadors, provides “the appropriate relation of
asymmetric entailment” between the alternatives. This suggests that it is not common
knowledge that is at stake here. In the rest of this paper, I will thus put aside this
issue of the proper analysis of existential import.
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4 Short-sightedness
How can we tackle the challenge to Blindness raised by Hirschberg’s contextually
ordered alternatives? Schlenker (p. 421) diagnoses that “the problem is that Magri’s
account is in a way ‘too’ blind: it has insufficient access to contextual knowledge.”
He thus proposes an alternative which is ‘less’ blind and that I will therefore dub
contextual Short-sightedness. Yet, this section shows that, under natural assumptions
on the set of alternatives, Schlenker’s Short-sightedness is provably equivalent to
Blindness: they are a notational variant of each other. I conclude that Schlenker’s
proposed solution is a technical mistake: Short-sightedness offers no new ammuni-
tions against the challenge of contextually ordered alternatives. Section 6 will thus
take a closer look at the challenge.
4.1 Weakening Blindness to short-sightedness
The actual common knowledge cactual provides a wealth of information about Italy
and Italians, some of which is listed in (22).
(22) The actual common knowledge cactual entails:
a. That all Italians come from the same country.
b. That Italian food is way better than French food.
...
The Blindness condition boxed in (10), repeated below, says that, when checking the
oddness of the sentence j = Some Italians come from a warm country in (7a), we
consider its strengthened meaning [[[j]]]c=W relative to the entire set W of possible
worlds. This means that each one of the various pieces of common knowledge listed
in (22) is wiped out.
(10) Oddness filter: blind formulation (repeated).
A sentence j sounds odd relative to the actual common knowledge cactual
provided [[[j]]]c\cactual = /0 where c=W = the set of all possible worlds .
Schlenker (2012: section 4) suggests that this is overkilling and thus advocates a more
moderate approach. He correctly notices that, in order for the implicature-based ac-
count of the oddness of our sentence j = Some Italians come from a warm country
to go through, we only need the strengthened meaning to be blind to the piece of
common knowledge (22a). Other pieces of common knowledge, such as (22b), are
inoffensive. Since they are inoffensive, there is no reason why they need to be wiped
out as well. Schlenker therefore replaces the blind oddness filter (10) with the variant
in (23). As he explains, “the basic idea is that if any weakening of a (global or local)
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context gives rise to an implicature—whether global or embedded—which contra-
dicts the assertive component of the clause that triggers it, we obtain a misleading
implicature, and the sentence is deviant.” (p. 423).
(23) Oddness filter: short-sighted formulation.
A sentence j sounds odd relative to the actual common knowledge cactual
provided [[[j]]]c\cactual = /0 for some c such that W ◆ c◆ cactual .
The two filters (10) and (23) only differ for the boxed conditions. In particular, both
proposals assume that the common knowledge c used to compute the strengthened
meaning relevant for the oddness filter is not the actual common knowledge cactual
but a weakening c thereof. The two proposals differ because Schlenker does not
require this weakening c to be the weakest weakening, namely the entire set W
of all possible worlds. In particular, while W differs from the actual common
knowledge cactual because it contains worlds where each of the propositions in (22)
fails, Schlenker’s weakening c could still support, say, (22b), while allowing for
possible words where (22a) fails. In conclusion, Schlenker’s replaces Blindness with
contextual Short-sightedness.
4.2 Short-sightedness is equivalent to Blindness
As anticipated in subsection 2.2, a crucial choice point in the definition of the
strengthened meaning concerns the proper definition of the set of excluded alter-
natives: in terms of asymmetric entailment, as in (5); or else in terms of non-
contradictoriness, as in (6). As this distinction will be relevant throughout this
subsection, let me replace the ambiguous notation [[[·]]] and Excl used so far with the
notation [[[·]]]AE, [[[·]]]NC and ExclAE,ExclNC, which disambiguates whether asymmetric
entailment (AE) or non-contradictoriness (NC) is used in the definition of the set of
excluded alternatives and thus in the computation of the strengthened meaning.
Schlenker is not explicit on which one of these two options he endorses. His
discussion seems to assume excluded alternatives to be defined in terms of asym-
metric entailment. Yet, he (p. 418) incorrectly attributes the choice of asymmetric
entailment over non-contradictoriness to Magri (2011), suggesting that he is sticking
with that choice only for ease of comparison with my earlier work. That is not
correct: Magri (2009b,a, 2011) unequivocally advocates the definition of excluded
alternatives in terms of non-contradictoriness. Indeed, I submit that the litera-
ture has nowadays reached a consensus that the definition in terms of asymmetric
entailment is too restrictive and needs to be replaced by a definition in terms of
non-contradictoriness (see Spector to appear).
Be that as it may, this subsection proves that the short-sighted oddness filter (23)
is equivalent to the blind oddness filter (10), irrespectively of whether excludability is
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defined in terms of non-contradictoriness or asymmetric entailment. This equivalence
holds under mild and natural assumptions on the set of scalar alternatives and under
no assumptions whatsoever on the actual common knowledge cactual.
4.2.1 When exclusion is defined through non-contradictoriness
Let me start with the case where the strengthened meaning used in the oddness
filter is [[[j]]]NC, namely it is defined in terms of non-contradictoriness. In this case,
Short-sightedness and Blindness are equivalent without any additional assumptions
on the set of scalar alternatives, as stated in (24). The equivalence (24) is mentioned
by Schlenker in subsection 4.3.4 of his NALS paper. Yet, he informs me (p.c. by
email of 01/18/2012) that he decided not to include that subsection in the submitted
version of the paper but added it at the end of the NALS review process. The present
paper therefore represents the first time that the equivalence (24) undergoes peer
reviewing.
(24) Blindeness: Short-sightedness:
[[[j]]]cNC\cactual = /0
with c=W
() [[[j]]]cNC\cactual = /0
for some c◆ cactual
In fact, the implication =) trivially follows from the fact that c is existentially
quantified over by Short-sightedness and subject only to the condition that c◆ cactual.
The latter condition is obviously satisfied by the position c = W considered by
Blindness. The reverse implication(= follows from the obvious property (25) of
the set ExclcNC of excluded alternatives defined in terms of non-contradictoriness: it
is monotone relative to the common knowledge c, in the sense that it cannot shrink
when the world set c grows.7
(25) For any two set of worlds c0 and c00, for any alternative y:
If: c0 ✓ c00
Then: y 2 Exclc0NC(j) entails that y 2 Exclc00NC(j)
It follows that any alternative y negated by the short-sighted strengthened meaning
[[[j]]]cNC is also excluded by the blind strengthened meaning [[[j]]]c=WNC . If the for-
mer strengthened meaning is a contextual contradiction, the latter is a contextual
contradiction as well. The equivalence in (24) is therefore established.
As reviewed in section 3, contextually ordered alternatives challenge Blindness.
Let me show that Short-sightedness fares no better when the alternatives are defined
7 As explained in footnote 5, the specific definition of ExclNC provided in (6) is too weak, because it
looks at non-contradictoriness of the negation of each individual alternative by itself. This definition
needs to be replaced with a more careful restatement, which looks at the non-contradictoriness of
the conjunction of the negations of an entire bunch of alternatives. The monotonicity property (25)
plausibly carries over to such a refined definition of ExclNC.
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in terms of non-contradictoriness, thus illustrating concretely the equivalence be-
tween Blindness and Short-sightedness just established abstractly. For the present
purpose, the challenge can be recalled as follows. In order to account for the oddness
of sentence (27a), we need the mismatching implicature that Not all Italians come
from a warm country. In order to get that implicature, we need to assume that
the strengthened meaning (as well as overt only) is blind to the piece of common
knowledge (26a).
(26) The actual common knowledge cactual entails:
a. That all Italians come from the same country.
b. That college presupposes high school.
...
(27) a. #Some Italians come from a warm country. = jsome
b. Mary has a college degree. = jcollege
But why shouldn’t then the strengthened meaning of sentence (27b) be blind to
the piece of common knowledge (26b)? That would generate the mismatching
implicature thatMary does not have a high school degree, thus incorrectly predicting
sentence (26b) to sound odd as well (because it contradicts common knowledge on
college admittance requirements).
Short-sightedness has an existential quantification over weakenings c of the
actual common knowledge cactual which makes it flexible enough to ignore either
piece of common knowledge (26a) or (26b) thus failing to account for the oddness
asymmetry between (27a) and (27b). Of course, it is not unconceivable that the two
pieces of common knowledge (26a) and (26b) are not on equal footing. It might
indeed be possible to provide independent evidence that the piece of common knowl-
edge (26a) that Italians come form the same country is less “entrenched” or more
“defeasible” than the piece of common knowledge (26b) that college presupposes
high school. In that case, the unrestricted existential quantification over weakenings
c which figures in the current formulation of Schlenker’s Short-sightedness could be
properly restricted in such a way to derive the asymmetry in (27). But as it stands,
Short-sightedness has no advantage over Blindness.8
8 Short-sightedness does not help neither with Schlenker’s original formulation of the challenge of
contextually ordered alternatives, recalled in subsection 3.1. In fact, the two alternatives jhigh school
and jcollege in (14) are contextually equivalent relative to Schlenker’s special context (13). Allowing
the oddness filter more context sensitivity thus does not help explaining why only jhigh school but not
jcollege sounds odd in that context.
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4.2.2 When exclusion is defined through asymmetric entailment
Let me now turn to the case where the strengthened meaning used in the oddness filter
is [[[j]]]AE, namely it is defined in terms of asymmetric entailment. Independently
of oddness, this option is known to run into the following difficulty. In the proper
context, sentence jAdam in (28a) implies that Adam was the only student to solve
the problem. In other words, jAdam seems to trigger the implicature ¬yBill that the
alternative yBill in (28b) is false. Yet, this alternative yBill does not entail (let alone
asymmetrically entail) the prejacent jAdam. Analogously, the sentence jcollege in
(29a) can trigger the implicature ¬yconservatory that the alternative yconservatory in (29b)
is false; yet, this alternative yconservatory does not entail (let alone asymmetrically
entail) the prejacent jcollege.9
(28) a. Adam solved the problem. = jAdam
b. Bill solved the problem. = yBill
c. Adam solved the pbm and Bill solved the pbm. = jBill^yAdam = S
(29) a. Adam has a college degree. = jcollege
b. Adam has a conservatory degree. = yconservatory
c. Adam has college and conservatory degrees. = jcollege^yconservatory = S
Assume that the strengthened meaning and overt only share the same definition
of excluded alternatives, as suggested in subsection 2.4. Then, the variants with
overt only, namely Only Adam solved the problem and Adam only has a college
degree, exacerbate this difficulty for a definition of excluded alternatives based on
asymmetric entailment.
The only way out seems the following. The intended implicature of a sentence
such as jAdam in (28a) is derived not through the alternative yBill in (28b), which
fails the asymmetric entailment condition. Rather, it is derived through a different
alternative S which happens to entail both the prejacent jAdam (thus displaying the
required entailment) as well as the original alternative yBill (thus providing the
intended implicature). The simplest choice for this alternative S is of course the
conjunction of jAdam and yBill, as in (28c). Analogous considerations lead to the
postulation of the conjoined alternative S in (29c). I conclude that the definition of
excludability in terms of asymmetric entailment requires the assumption that, if y is
an alternative of a sentence j , the corresponding conjoined alternative S= j ^y is
an alternative of j as well.
Under the latter apparently unavoidable assumption on the set of scalar al-
ternatives, Short-sightedness and Blindness turn out to be equivalent also when
excludability is defined in terms of asymmetric entailment, as stated in (30).
9 Here, I have in mind the European school system, where music conservatory is not college and the
two degrees can be pursued independently of each other.
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(30) Blindeness: Short-sightedness:
[[[j]]]cAE\cactual = /0
with c=W
() [[[j]]]cAE\cactual = /0
for some c◆ cactual
Again, the implication =) trivially follows from the fact that c is existentially
quantified over by Short-sightedness and that it is only subjected to the condition c◆
cactual, which is obviously satisfied by the position c=W considered by Blindness.
The reverse implication(= follows from the obvious property (31) of the set ExclcAE
of excluded alternatives defined in terms of asymmetric entailment: it is monotone
relative to the common knowledge c when we restrict ourselves to the relevant
alternatives, namely those obtained through conjunction with the prejacent.
(31) For any two contexts c0 and c00 and any conjoined alternative S= j ^y:
If: c0 ✓ c00
Then: S 2 Exclc0AE(j) entails S 2 Exclc00AE(j)
It follows that any alternative S= j ^y negated by the short-sighted strengthened
meaning [[[j]]]cAE is also excluded by the blind strengthened meaning [[[j]]]c=WAE . If the
former strengthened meaning is a contextual contradiction, the latter is a contextual
contradiction as well. The equivalence in (30) is therefore established.
Let me take stock. Once excluded alternatives are defined in terms of asym-
metric entailment, the set of alternatives of j needs to be enriched with these
conjoined alternatives of the form S = j ^y . This move effectively wipes out
any difference between the two definitions based on asymmetric entailment and
non-contradictoriness. As a consequence, the set of excluded alternatives displays
analogous monotonicity properties (25) and (31), independently of whether it is
defined in terms of asymmetric entailment or non-contradictoriness. In conclusion,
Blindness and Short-sightedness turn out to be equivalent also when the strength-
ened meaning used in the oddness filter is [[[j]]]AE, namely it is defined in terms of
asymmetric entailment.
As reviewed in section 3, contextually ordered alternatives are problematic
for Blindness. Let me show that Short-sightedness fares no better when the al-
ternatives are defined in terms of asymmetric entailment, thus illustrating con-
cretely the equivalence between Blindness and Short-sightedness just established
abstractly. For the present purpose, the challenge raised by contextually ordered
alternatives can be recalled as follows: in the proper context, the sentence jcollege =
Mary has a college degree triggers the scalar implicature that Mary lacks a conser-
vatory degree but does not trigger the implicature that Mary lacks a high school
degree, as jcollege would otherwise sound odd because of a mismatch with the piece
of common knowledge that college presupposes high school. These facts extend
to the corresponding sentence with overt only. As we have just seen, an approach
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to scalar implicatures (or overt only) committed to asymmetric entailment needs to
allow for conjoined alternatives such as those in (32). For instance, the conjoined
alternative jcollege^yconservatory in (32a) is needed in order for our sentence jcollege to
trigger the implicature that Mary lacks a conservatory degree.
(32) a. Mary has college and conservatory degrees. = jcollege^yconservatory
b. Mary has college and high school degrees. = jcollege^yhigh school
...
Short-sightedness allows the actual common knowledge cactual to be slightly weak-
ened to a knowledge c which fails at entailing the proposition that college pre-
supposes high school. The conjoined alternative jcollege^yhigh school in (32b) asym-
metrically entails jcollege relative to this weakened common knowledge c. Hence,
this conjoined alternative jcollege ^yhigh school belongs to the set ExclcAE(jcollege) of
alternatives excluded by the sentence jcollege relative to c. The short-sighted oddness
filter (just like the blind filter) thus incorrectly predicts the sentence jcollege to be
odd, because its short-sighted strengthened meaning [[[jcollege]]]cAE entails in particular
that jcollege^¬(jcollege^yhigh school), namely that Mary has a college degree but no
high school degree.
In order to rescue sentence jcollege from oddness, it would be crucial to neutralize
the conjoined alternative jcollege ^yhigh school in (32b)—although crucially not the
conjoined alternative jcollege^yconservatory in (32a), which is needed to get the impli-
cature that Mary lacks a conservatory degree. A possible way to achieve that would
be to exploit the fact that jcollege ^yhigh school is contextually equivalent to jcollege
relative to the actual common knowledge cactual and yet “longer” and thus “worse”.
This would require advocating something like the following procedure:
(33) Step 1: construct the set of basic (i.e., non-conjoined) relevant scalar al-
ternatives.
Step 2: add the alternatives obtained through conjunction of a base alter-
natives with the prejacent.
Step 3: take the actual common knowledge cactual into account and prune
those conjoined alternatives which are equivalent to the prejacent
relative to cactual.
Step 4: consider a weakening c◆ cactual of the actual common knowledge
cactual and compute the strengthened meaning using asymmetric
entailment relative to c, not relative to cactual
Note that in step 3 it is crucial that we only eliminate the contextually equivalent
conjoined alternatives, not the contextually equivalent basic alternatives, as otherwise
we lose the leverage to derive the oddness of basic cases such as Some Italians come
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from a warm country. The intuition indeed ought to be that conjoined alternatives
are “worse” than basic alternatives and thus more prone to be eliminated (or never
generated).
Yet, I submit that even this maneuvering would fail at protecting the sentence
jcollege from being incorrectly labeled as odd by the Short-sighted oddness filter. To
illustrate, common knowledge about the Italian school system entails that there are
two types of high school, one with a scientific orientation (liceo scientifico) and one
with a focus on the humanities (liceo classico). Both provide access to college. The
challenge raised by the single alternative jcollege ^yhigh school in (32b) can now be
mimicked with the conjoined action of the two following alternatives (34).
(34) a. Bill has college and liceo scientifico degrees. = jcollege^yliceo scientifico
b. Bill has college and liceo classico degrees. = jcollege^yliceo classico
Common knowledge has nothing to say concerning Mary’s inclination for the hard
sciences or the humanities. Hence, the two alternatives jcollege^yliceo scientifico and
jcollege^yliceo classico are not ruled out at step 3 of the procedure (33), because they
are not contextually equivalent to the base sentence jcollege.
5 Gricean credentials
Blindness (10) and Short-sightedness (23) both assume that the common knowledge
c considered in the strengthened meaning [[[j]]]c evaluated by the oddness filter is
different from the actual knowledge cactual. How can this assumption be made sense
of? Subsection 2.4 has tackled this question for Blindness. This section reviews and
challenges Schlenker’s pragmatic answer to this question for Short-sightedness.
5.1 Fallibility
Schlenker suggests that Short-sightedness can be made to follow from Gricean
reasoning. His proposal has two ingredients. The first ingredient is (35), which
Schlenker dubs Fallibility because it captures the intuition that “communicative
agents are fallible, and that there is always a very slight chance that the addressee
might forget information about the context set” (p. 404). The second ingredient is
(36), which “adapt[s] standard Gricean principles of preference to a framework that
countenances Fallibility”.
(35) “At any point t in a conversation, for any proposition p which was believed
by the addressee at t 1, there is a small chance that an error will make the
addressee forget p” (p. 405).
(36) “If a sentence S transmits to the addressee at least as much true information
as sentence S0 in all cases, and transmits strictly more true information than
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S0 in some cases triggered by Fallibility, then it is to be preferred to S0”
(p. 406).
To illustrate, the sentence S = (All) Italians come from a warm country makes a
better contribution to the pragmatics of the conversation than the alternative S0 =
Some Italians come from a warm country, whereby the oddness of the latter. In
fact, S is contextually equivalent to S0, whereby it transmits at least as much true
information in all cases (where Fallibility does not apply). Furthermore, Fallibility
requires the speaker to entertain the possibility that the addressee is momentarily
oblivious to the fact that Italians all come from Italy. In such a circumstance, the
universally quantified sentence S transmits strictly more true information than the
existentially quantified sentence S0.
5.2 Griceanizability
Is it plausible to assume that the pragmatics of the conversation requires the speaker
to entertain the hypothesis that the fallible addressee might have blanked out the fact
that Italians come from Italy? Having lived in France for a few years, I understand
that this assumption of a fallible addressee might capture the proverbial arrogance of
the French speaker. Yet, outside of French pragmatics, Fallibility seems to me to
be of little help. Indeed, let me say that the computation of scalar implicatures is
griceanizable provided the mapping j 7! [[[j]]]c which associates (the plain meaning
of) an utterance with its strengthened meaning can be implemented through an algo-
rithm whose steps all admit an independent motivation rooted in the phenomenology
of human social interaction—and thus need not be encoded as idiosyncratic assump-
tions of a specialized grammatical module. Because of this focus on independent
pragmatic motivations, establishing griceanizability is a task which pertains more to
social psychology than to linguistics (anecdotical evidence from recommendation
letters belongs indeed to folk social psychology). Does Fallibility contribute to the
griceanizability of the algorithm for the computation of scalar implicatures? The
answer really depends on whether it admits the required independent pragmatic
justification. Currently, it does not: “fallibility is a technical assumption which is
largely justified theory-internally”, as Schlenker admits (p. 407). I conclude that, as
it stands, Fallibility contributes nothing to the Griceanizability of Short-sightedness.
It is nothing more than a reformulation of the sheer stipulation it was meant to
derive, namely that the strengthened meaning evaluated by the oddness filter is not
computed relative to the actual common knowledge.
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6 A closer look at the challenge of contextually ordered alternatives
Hirschberg’s contextually ordered alternatives raise a challenge for contextual Blind-
ness, as seen in section 3. Schlenker therefore suggests to replace Blindness with a
more moderate contextual Short-sightedness. Yet, Blindness and Short-sightedness
turn out to be equivalent, as seen in section 4. It thus looks like we are left with
no ammunitions against the challenge of contextually ordered alternatives.10 This
section thus takes a closer look at the challenge. The goal is to provide some initial
evidence in favor of the following conjecture. Whenever contextual ordering seems
to drive a certain pattern of scalar behavior, there is actually more logical structure
than meets the eye and provides a logical ordering homorphous to the contextual
ordering. It is the logical ordering (not the contextual ordering) which drives the
scalar behavior. The contextual ordering thus never plays any role in scalar behavior,
as predicted by Blindness (or the equivalent Short-sightedness). This section admit-
tedly offers only a preliminary and tentative discussion of this conjecture, deferring
its thorough investigation to future work.
6.1 Alleged contextually ordered alternatives require specific lexical choices
Let me say that two alternatives j,y form a Hirschberg (contextually ordered) pair
hj,yi provided they satisfy the three conditions (37).
(37) a. j and y are logically independent: neither logically entails the other.
b. y asymmetrically entails j relative to the actual common knowledge.
c. ‘only j’ and [[[j]]] entail ¬y; but ‘only y’ and [[[y]]] do not entail ¬j .
10 Danny Fox (p.c.) pointed out to me a solution to this impasse based on relevance. Here is the
idea. Consider again the basic case of the odd sentence jsome =Some Italians come from a warm
country. Assume that the algorithm for scalar implicatures is indeed blind to common knowledge.
The algorithm will thus generate the implicature that yall =All Italians come from a warm country
is false. But why is that implicature locked in place (condemning the sentence to oddness) rather
than automatically cancelled (say, because of the contextual contradiction)? In Magri (2011), I
propose the following answer: the mismatching implicature is mandatory because yall is necessarily
relevant due the the fact that jsome is relevant (because it has been uttered), that jsome,yall are
contextually equivalent, and that relevance is closed relative to contextual equivalence. Fox notes
that the sentence jcollege =Mary has a college degree is not contextually equivalent to the alternative
yhigh school =Mary has a high school degree in the out-of-the-blue context considered in subsection
3.2. Therefore, the inference ¬yhigh school is not a mandatory implicature of jcollege. In other
words, the theory of oddness based on mismatching scalar implicatures does not strictly speaking
predict jcollege to be odd, as desired. Unfortunately, Fox’s suggestion does not extend to Schlenker’s
special context considered in subsection 3.1, as the two alternatives jcollege,yhigh school are indeed
contextually equivalent in that case. Furthermore, it does not extend to contrasts such as (39) and
(41) discussed below in this section.
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To illustrate, the two alternatives in (38) are a Hirschberg pair. In fact, they are not
logically ordered, as prescribed by (37a). Yet, they are ordered relative to the piece
of common knowledge that college presupposes high school, as prescribed by (37b).
Finally, they display the asymmetric behavior prescribed by (37c). In fact, sentence
j =Mary has a high school degree implies (and the variant with overt only entails)
that ¬y , namely that Mary dropped out of school after high school and thus did
not attend college; but sentence y =Mary has a college degree does not imply (nor
does the variant with overt only say) that ¬j , namely that Mary skipped high school.
(38)
⌦
j =Mary has a high school degree, y =Mary has a college degree
↵
Hirschberg alternatives display a behavior (37c) which mirrors their contextual
ordering (37b), not their (lack of) logical ordering (37a). If scalar implicatures and
overt only were contextually blind (or short-sighted), Hirschberg pairs should not
exist. This is the essence of the challenge reviewed in section 3.
I would like to take the edge off this challenge as follows. If scalar implicatures
and overt only were indeed sensitive to the actual common knowledge, it should be
very easy to construct Hirschberg pairs. Indeed, Hirschberg (1991: p. 83) herself
seems to suggest that any two logically independent alternatives could be turned into
a Hirschberg pair through the proper manipulation of the common knowledge: “I will
propose a new characterization of these orderings [that support scalar implicatures]
as partially [contextually] ordered sets and claim that any poset can support scalar
implicatures”. Instead, I submit that Hirschberg pairs are restricted and crucially
dependent on specific lexical choices. To start, let me point out that a number of
examples considered in Hirschberg (1991: chapter 8) (building on earlier literature,
such as Harnish 1979; Horn 1972; Kempson 1975; Gazdar 1979, 1980; Prince 1982;
Walker 1975; Levinson 1983, etcetera) do not actually qualify as Hirschberg pairs to
start with. For instance, she discusses scales such as hacquaintance, friend, loveri
and hprivate, corporal, sergeanti and remarks (p. 98) that “while lovers may also be
friends, they need not be—and sergeants cannot be privates”, thus concluding that
the corresponding alternatives are not ordered by any entailment. Furthermore, they
do not display the asymmetric behavior required by (37c): the sentence John is only
a friend implies that he is not a lover and the sentence John is (only) a lover can be
read as implying that he is not also a friend.
Sentence (39a) is instead a pertinent example. It is fine in the context considered
and it says that the train did not make it to stop D but it does not imply that the train
skipped any of the stops preceding C. This example indeed illustrates a class of
examples discussed in Hirschberg (1991: subsection 5.1.8). Since the ordering of
the stops obviously pertains to the common knowledge, the two alternatives in (40a)
count as a Hirschberg pair.
(39) Context: I go to work by train. The train route is A! B!C! D! E.
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The train always leaves from station A, and goes through one station at the
time. Sometimes though, the train breaks down before it gets to the final
station E.
a. Yesterday, the train only arrived at stationC.
b. #Yesterday, the train only stopped/made a stop at stationC.
(40) a. hj = the train arrived at B, y = the train arrived at Ci
b. hj = the train stopped at B, y = the train stopped at Ci
Crucially, sentence (39b) instead sounds odd in the same context, although it only
minimally differs for the choice of the main predicate. Intuitively, oddness is due
to the fact that (39b) implies that the train skipped the stops preceding C. In other
words, when only is applied to any of the two alternatives in (40b), it excludes the
other, despite the fact that the two alternatives are contextually ordered. The two
alternatives in (40b) are therefore not a Hirschberg pair, because their symmetric
behavior does not mirror their contextual asymmetric entailment relationship.11 This
contrast seems to me surprising under the assumption that the semantics of overt
only as well as the computation of scalar implicatures are sensitive to contextual
information. Under this assumption, they should be able to detect the contextual
asymmetric entailment between the two alternatives in both pairs (40a) and (40b)
and thus yield a fine upper-bounded meaning in both cases (39a) and (39b).
Examples like this can be easily multiplied. Another analogous contrast is
provided in (41). Sentence (41a) is fine in the context considered and thus does
not imply that Mary skipped introductory Calculus. The two alternatives in (42a)
thus count as a Hirschberg pair. But sentence (41b), which only differs because
the main predicate has been changed to took, is odd because it implies that Mary
skipped introductory Calculus. The two alternatives in (42b) therefore do not form a
Hirschberg pair.
11 In (39) and in the rest of this section, I consider sentences containing overt only, which makes the
judgments sharper. I submit nonetheless that the relevant judgments extend to the corresponding
sentences without overt only. For instance, the contrast in (39) does extend to the corresponding
sentences without only, at least when they are construed as answers to a proper question, such as
Where did the train arrive/stop yesterday? Furthermore, there is indeed a contrast between sentences
(ia) and (ib) relative to the actual world where the train stoppes are lined up as specified.
(i) a. #Yesterday, the train arrived at A, B and C.
b. Yesterday, the train stopped at A, B and C.
It is tempting to explain this contrast as follows. Sentence (ia) is deviant because it is equivalent to
the shorter sentence The train arrived at C. Sentence (ib) is instead fine because it is not equivalent to
the shorter sentence The train stopped at C, as the latter does trigger the inference that the train did
not stop at A and B.
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(41) Context: Prof. Smith teaches introductory Calculus, intermediate Calculus,
and advanced Calculus. He is strict about requirements and never allows
any student to take one of his Calculus classes without having taken the
preceding one(s). While in college, did Mary take any classes with him?
a. Mary only got to intermediate Calculus.
b. #Mary only took intermediate Calculus.
(42) a. hj =Mary got to introductory Calculus, y =Mary got to intermediate Calculusi
b. hj =Mary took introductory Calculus, y =Mary took intermediate Calculusi
If only and scalar implicatures were sensitive to contextual ordering, why should
there be any difference between the pairs of alternatives (42a) and (42b)?
Let me consider again the very same example about school degrees used in
section 3.2 to challenge Blindness. As a reminder, the crucial observation is that
sentence (43a) says that Mary lacks a college degree but it says nothing about her
junior high school degree. In other words, the two alternatives (38), repeated in
(44a), count as a Hirschberg pair. Sentence (43b) instead cannot be construed as
saying that Mary has transcripts only up to high school (because she only attended
up to high school and then skipped college). In other words, the two alternatives
(44b) do not count as a Hirschberg pair.
(43) a. Mary only has a high school degree.
b. Mary only has transcripts from high school.
c. Maria
Mary
ha
has
frequentato
frequented
solo
only
il
the
liceo.
high school
(44) a. hj =Mary has a junior high degree, y =Mary has a high school degreei
b. hj =Mary has junior high school transcripts,
y =Mary has high school transcriptsi
c. hj =Maria ha frequentato le scuole medie, y =Maria ha frequentato il liceoi
Furthermore, Italian has a predicate frequentare (same as French fréquenter) which
roughly means “sit through” and thus loosely translates English attend. Despite
sentence (43c) providing a close translation of the original sentence (43a), it does
seem to me to imply that Maria skipped elementary and junior high school (as well
as that she did not get to college).12 In other words, the two alternatives (44c) do
not count as a Hirschberg pair neither. Crucially, the original sentence (43a) and the
variants (43b) and (43c) tap into the same piece of common knowledge concerning
the school system. How could a context sensitive only (and a context sensitive
12 Two French informants and two Italian informants confirmed this intuition; the judgment for the
English sentence with the predicate attend seems less clear to me.
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strengthened meaning) be sensitive to that common knowledge only in the former
case?
Let me close with the observation that not only overt only and scalar implicatures
seem to be sensitive to this subtle distinction between Hirschberg and non-Hirschberg
pairs. Also the acceptability of which-Nsing questions where Nsing is a singular noun
seems to make the same distinction. Indeed, Hirschberg pairs yield the felicitous
which-Nsing questions in (45): these questions do not imply that the train made a
unique stop, that the addressee took a unique Calculus class, or that (s)he has a
unique school degree. Non-Hirschberg pairs instead yield the questions in (46)
which are infelicitous precisely because they trigger these undesired implications.
(45) a. Which stop did the train arrive to?
b. Which level of Calculus did you get to?
c. Which school degree do you have?
(46) a. Which stop did the train stop at?
b. Which Calculus class did you take?
c. Which school do you have transcripts of?
d. Quale
which
scuola
school
hai
have-you
frequentato?
attended?
Let me take stock. Hirschberg pairs such as (40a), (42a), and (44a) come with
minimal variants (40b), (42b), and (44b)-(44c) which are not Hirschberg pairs.
In other words, Hirschberg pairs require specific lexical choices: arrive at stop
C instead of stop at C; get to intermediate Calculus instead of take intermediate
Calculus; attend high school instead of frequentare il liceo. If scalar implicatures
and overt only had access to contextual ordering, why should these minimal lexical
differences matter? The data presented in this subsection thus take the edge off
the challenge against Blindness (or the equivalent Short-sightedness) discussed in
section 3.
6.2 Alleged contextually ordered alternatives involve logical ordering
The challenge nonetheless remains: how can Blindness cope with Hirschberg pairs
such as (40a), (42a), and (44a), where it looks like contextual ordering is driving
the scalar behavior?13 This subsection offers a tentative answer to this question,
13 The complementary cases (40b), (42b), and (44b)-(44c) which do not yield Hirschberg pairs follow
straightforwardly from the assumption that the set of excluded alternatives which appears in the
definition (4) of the strengthened meaning and the semantics (12) of overt only is blind to contextual
information and defined in terms of non-contradictoriness as in (6). Since the two alternatives in
(40b) and those in (42b) are logically unordered, the symmetric scalar behavior displayed by these
non-Hirschberg pairs follows straightforwardly.
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although I acknowledge that the range of facts considered in the preceding subsection
is admittedly too restricted to warrant any solid conclusions. I would like to put
forward the conjecture that in these cases problematic for Blindness there is actually
a logical ordering which happens to be homomorphous to the contextual ordering.
It is not the contextual ordering but the logical ordering which is driving the scalar
behavior, as predicted by Blindness (or the equivalent Short-sightedness). I will
explore two instances of this logical ordering: the ordering among degrees (d0   d)
and the ordering among events (e0 ) e).
6.2.1 Logical ordering of degrees: d0   d
Let me start with the original case discussed in subsection 3.2, repeated once more
in (47). The challenge is to account for the fact that the sentence jhigh school implies
that Mary lacks a college degree while the sentence jcollege does not imply that Mary
lacks a high school degree.
(47) a. jhigh school =Mary has a high school degree  ¬jcollege
b. jcollege =Mary has a college degree 6 ¬jhigh school
Schlenker interprets this asymmetry (47) as evidence that the strengthened meaning
of jhigh school is jhigh school^¬jcollege but that the strengthened meaning of jcollege is
not jcollege^¬jhigh school. I would like to explore a different approach. Assume that
high school degree is actually a degree expression, just like the numeral two. It
is only a matter of common knowledge that the degree denoted by one is smaller
than the degree denoted by two. Or that the expression high school degree denotes
a degree of education which is smaller than the degree denoted by college degree.
Since scalar implicatures and overt only are blind to common knowledge, they are in
particular blind to this information. Yet, the ordering of degrees (together with the
monotonicity of the environment where the degree expression occurs) suffices for
Blindness to only exclude the alternatives corresponding to larger degrees, without
also negating the alternatives corresponding to smaller degrees. In other words, the
strengthened meaning of the sentenceMary has a high school degree (or equivalently
the plain meaning of the corresponding sentence with overt only) is (48a). This
pragma-semantics is completely analogous to the one in (48b) for the sentenceMary
has two children with the degree expression two.
(48) a. has-education(m,dhigh school)^
^
d dhigh school
¬has-education(m,d)
b. has-children(m,2)^ ^
d 2
¬has-children(m,d)
The predicate has-education in (48a) holds of Mary and a degree d if and only if
Mary has a level of education which is equal to or higher than the degree of education
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d. The strengthened meaning (48a) excludes has-education(m,d) for any degree d
larger than the degree of education dhigh school denoted by high school degree. The
computation of this strengthened meaning requires no mundane knowledge about
high schools, colleges and their admittance requirements. Consider the variants of
the alternatives (47) obtained by replacing has a degree with has transcripts and
with the Italian frequentare. As noted above, the alternatives (44b) and (44c) thus
obtained do not count as Hirschberg pairs. This would now follow easily from
the plausible assumption that the alternatives thus obtained cannot be construed as
degree expressions.
As recalled in subsection 3.1, Schlenker adds an interesting twist to the asymme-
try in (47): he points out that this asymmetry persists even when common knowledge
is tampered with to the effect of replacing the out-of-the-blue contextual asymmetric
entailment between jcollege and jhigh school with contextual equivalence, as in his sce-
nario (13), where every employee has a high school degree if and only if (s)he has
a college degree. As I argued above, Schlenker’s observation (far from providing
an argument against Blindness) suggests that contextual entailment is plausibly not
playing any role in the proper derivation of the asymmetric behavior in (47), as the
asymmetry persists even without contextual ordering. The proposal sketched here,
that the asymmetry (47) follows from logical properties of the ordering of degrees of
education through the pragma-semantics in (48), instead makes sense of Schlenker’s
observation: tampering with the common knowledge should have no effect on the
asymmetry.
6.2.2 Logical ordering of events: e0 ) e
I will now extend the preceding account to the other cases discussed in subsection
6.1, only using the mereological ordering of events instead of the ordering of degrees.
To start, consider the observation (39) that arrive yields a Hirschberg pair while stop
does not. What could be the relevant difference? I submit the following intuition. In
the actual world, the event estopB of the train stopping at B and the event e
stop
C of the
train stopping atC are disjoint, independent events, as depicted in (49a).
(49) a. estopB e
stop
C
b. earriveB e
arrive
C
The case of arriving events is different. I submit that in the actual world, the event
earriveB of the train arriving at B is a subset of the event e
arrive
C of the train arriving
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at C, as depicted in (49b).14 In other words, what is special about the Hirschberg
pair of alternatives The train arrived at B and The train arrived at C is that the
contextual ordering of the alternatives is matched by the mereological ordering of
the corresponding events.
Analogous considerations hold for the case in (41), whereby the predicate got to
introductory/intermediate Calculus yields a Hirschberg pair while the predicate took
introductory/intermediate Calculus does not. I submit that in the actual world, the
event etakeintro of Mary taking introductory Calculus and the event e
take
inter of Mary taking
intermediate Calculus are disjoint, independent events, as represented in (50a).
(50) a. etakeintro e
take
inter
b. egetintro e
get
inter
The case of get to is different. I submit that in the actual world, the event egetintro of
Mary getting to introductory Calculus is a subset of the event egetinter of Mary getting
to intermediate Calculus, as depicted in (50b). In other words, what is special about
the Hirschberg pair of alternativesMary got to introductory Calculus andMary got
to intermediate Calculus is that the contextual ordering of the alternatives is matched
by the mereological ordering of the corresponding events.
All cases considered so far which fail at yielding a Hirschberg pair can be rescued
by adding up to, as shown by the contrasts in (51)-(54).
(51) a. #Yesterday, the train only stopped/made a stop at stationC.
14 Recent advances in the semantics of telic motion predicates support the conjecture that arriving
events have the mereological structure depicted in (49b), along the following lines. Building on a
large literature (which includes Krifka 1998; Hay, Kennedy & Levin 1999; Kennedy & Levin 2008;
Beavers 2008), Beavers (2013: section 2) proposes the scalar semantics (i) for a sentence such as John
walked to the station with the telic motion predicate walk. Here, s is a variable over path scales. The
predicate walk is a three-way relation between an event, a theme, and a path scale, as represented by
the first conjunct in (i). This relation encodes the fact that j is the agent of a walking event e along the
path scale s. The event and scale arguments are connected through a proper homomorphism between
the sub-events of e and the points of the path scale s (e.g., temporal adjacency in e corresponds to
degree adjacency in s). The other conjunct in (i) captures the condition that the station is the goal or
the end point of the walking event e relative to the path scale s.
(i) 9e9s⇥walk(e,s, john)^GOAL(e,s, thestation)⇤
This semantics plausibly extends from walk to to arrive at. The assumption that eB is an event of
the train arriving at B thus means that there exists a path scale sB such that arrive(eB,sB, train).
Analogously, the assumption that eC is an event of the train arriving at C means that there exists
a path scale sC such that arrive(eC,sC, train). The linear ordering of the stops along the railroad
entails that sB ✓ sC. It is not implausible that the homomorphism between events and path scales
ensures that sB ✓ sC entails eB ✓ eC, yielding the mereological structure depicted in (49b).
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b. Yesterday, the train only stopped/made a stop up to stationC.
(52) a. #Mary (only) took intermediate Calculus.
b. Mary (only) took up to intermediate Calculus.
(53) a. #Mary (only) has transcripts for high school.
b. Mary (only) only has transcripts up to high school.
(54) a. #Maria
Mary
ha
has
frequentato
attended
solo
only
il liceo.
high school
b. Maria
Mary
ha
has
frequentato
attended
solo
only
fino al
up to
liceo.
high school
Consider for instance the case in (51). I submit that up to turns the mereological
structure (49a) of stopping events into the one in (55): in the actual world, the event
estopuptoB of the train stopping up to B is a subset of the event e
stopupto
C of the train
stopping up toC. The operator up to thus turns the mereological structure of stopping
events into that of arriving events.
(55) estopuptoB e
stopupto
C
In other words, what is special about the Hirschberg pair of alternatives with up to
in (51b)-(54b) is that the contextual ordering of the alternatives is matched by the
mereological ordering of the corresponding events.
The evidence just reviewed supports the generalization that two alternatives
form a Hirschberg pair only when the mereological structure of the corresponding
events matches the contextual ordering of the two alternatives. Let me now show
how this generalization can be used to account for the behavior of Hirschberg pairs
despite Blindness. For concreteness, I focus on the contrast (39) between arrive and
stop–analogous considerations hold for the other cases considered so far. Let me
assume that the strengthened meaning of the sentence The train stopped at C (or
equivalently the plain meaning of the corresponding sentence with overt only) is
(56a). The prejacent says that e is an event of the train stopping at the location C.
The excluded alternatives say that e is the largest event of the train arriving (namely
that there exists no larger arriving event e0).
(56) a. 9e
h⇥
stop(e, t)^ LOC(e) = C⇤| {z }
prejacent
^ ^
e0)e
¬⇥stop(e0, t)⇤| {z }
alternative
i
b. 9e
h⇥
arrive(e, t)^GOAL(e) = C⇤| {z }
prejacent
^ ^
e0)e
¬⇥arrive(e0, t)⇤| {z }
alternative
i
Analogous formalism holds for the sentence The train arrived at C, as spelled
out in (56b). The only difference is that the event and the stop C are now related
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through a function GOAL which maps an arriving event to its end point or goal
(here I am using the terminology of Beavers 2008, 2013). The two formulas in (56)
effectively say that the largest event of the train stopping/arriving is an event of the
train stopping/arriving at C.
The two formulas in (56) share the general shape (4) of the strengthened meaning
or equivalently the general shape (12) of the plain meaning of a sentence containing
overt only. Nonetheless, a principled derivation of the pragma-semantics (56)
admittedly needs to overcome two difficulties which I leave open at this stage. The
first difficulty is that existential closure over the event argument e of the prejacent has
wide scope over both the prejacent and the negated alternatives in (56). This allows
the exclusion of only those alternatives which correspond to an event e0 such that
e0 ) e. This condition is analogous to the condition d0   d used above for degrees
and it will indeed play just the same crucial role in what follows.15 The second
difficulty against a principled derivation of the pragma-semantics (56) is how to
derive the restriction e0 ) e on the excluded alternatives from a general notion of
excluded alternatives such as those discussed in subsection 2.2.
These strengthened meanings (56a) and (56b) do not take into account the dif-
ference between the lexical predicates arrive and stop—exactly as the strengthened
meaning of the sentence Some P come from a warm country does not take into
account whether P is Italians or friends of mine. Furthermore, the proposed strength-
ened meanings do not rely on mundane knowledge concerning the train schedule or
the linear ordering of the five stops A through E in the actual world. They only rely
on the relation of inclusion e0 ) e which is defined on the domain of events. They
are thus analogous to the strengthened meaning in (48a), which does not rely on
mundane knowledge concerning high school and college admission requirements but
only relies on the ordering relation defined on the domain of degrees. I thus submit
that the pragma-semantics in (56) is compatible with Blindness (or the equivalent
Short-sightedness).
Let me now argue that (56) suffices to derive the contrast in (39), whereby the
sentence with arrive sounds fine in the context considered while the variant with
stop sounds odd because it triggers the implicature that the train skipped stop B. Let
me start with the latter fact. Thus, I need to show that, if the strengthened meaning
(56a) is true in the actual world, then the train skipped stop B. Indeed, suppose
15 If this assumption of a wide scope operator 9e turns out to be untenable, I would need to make use of
variants of (56) such as the equivalent formula in (i), which nonetheless is not as close to the general
scheme (4)/(12) for the strengthened meaning and the meaning of overt only.
(i) 9e⇥stop(e, t)^ LOC(e)=C⇤^^
e0
¬⇥stop(e0, t)^9e00[e00 ( e0 ^ stop(e00, t)^ LOC(e00)=C]⇤
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by contradiction that is not the case, namely that (56a) is true in the actual world
and that the train did stop at B. Since (56a) is true in the actual world, there exists
an event eC of the train stopping at C. The hypothesis that the train stopped at B
means that there exists also an event eB of the train stopping at B. Because of events’
mereological structure, there exists the event eB  eC which is the sum of those two
events. Assume that this sum event of two stopping events counts as a stopping
event itself. This would follow from Kratzer’s (in progress) Cumulatively hypothesis
applied to the event predicate stop. Since the two events eB and eC are disjoint
independent events as depicted in (49a), the sum event eB  eC properly includes the
event eC, as stated in (57). This proper inclusion holds irrespectively of whether the
stop B is on the train’s path toC in the actual world.
(57) eB  eC ) eC in the actual world.
By (57), the formula (56a) is false in the actual world because the alternative
corresponding to the event e0 = eB  eC is true. This conclusion yields the desired
contradiction. In other words, the strengthened meaning (56b) effectively requires
the train not to have made any stop anywhere else than at C, neither at the stops
precedingC nor at the stops followingC.
Let me now turn to the fact that the sentence (39a) with arrive sounds fine in
the envisioned scenario, namely it does not trigger the implicature that the train did
not arrive at B. Indeed, assume that arriving events have the mereological structure
depicted in (49b), whereby the event eB of the train arriving at B is a sub-event of the
event eC of the train arriving atC in the actual world, because of the linear ordering
of the train’s stops. The sum of two events eB and eC of the train arriving at B and
the train arriving atC is an event eB eC which is not larger than but rather coincides
with the event eC of the train arriving atC, as stated in (58).
(58) eB  eC = eC in the actual world.
Because of (58), the only way to construct an arriving event e0 which properly
contains the arriving event eC is for the train to have reached at least a little bit
further than C. In conclusion, the strengthened meaning (56b) with arrive does not
mismatch with common knowledge, because it simply denies that the train went any
further than stopC.
Let me take stock. Sticking with Blindness, the strengthened meanings (56a)
and (56b) for the two sentences with stop and arrive are formally identical. The
asymmetry observed in (39) follows from the fact that, when these two formally
identical strengthened meanings are deployed against common knowledge, the
different mereological properties of stopping and arriving events kick in. Because
of these different mereological properties (49a) and (49b), the logical relation of
inclusion among events is homomorphous with the linear ordering of the stops in
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the actual world in the case of arriving events but not in the case of stopping events.
This explains why in the case of arrive, but crucially not in the case of stop, the
scalar behavior seems to access the common knowledge concerning the ordering of
the stops, despite the fact that the scalar behavior is actually blind to that knowledge
and only sensitive to the logical ordering e0 ) e of events.
7 Conclusions
Three types of alternatives have been considered in the literature on scalar implica-
tures (and overt only). The alternatives (59a) and (59b) behave asymmetrically: the
former excludes the latter but not vice versa. This asymmetric behavior plausibly
reflects their logical asymmetric entailment relationship. The alternatives (60a)
and (60b) behave symmetrically: either one of the two excludes the other. This
symmetric behavior plausibly reflects their (logical and contextual) independence.
(59) Logically ordered alternatives:
a. Mary (only) met Adam or Bill.  ¬Mary met Adam and Bill
b. Mary (only) met Adam and Bill. 6 ¬Mary met Adam or Bill
(60) Unordered alternatives:
a. Mary (only) met Adam.  ¬Mary met Bill
b. Mary (only) met Bill.  ¬Mary met Adam
(61) Contextually ordered alternatives:
a. Mary has a high school degree.  ¬Mary has a college degree
b. Mary has a college degree. 6 ¬Mary has a high school degree
Hirschberg (1991) submits that there exists a third relevant case. The alternatives
(61a) and (61b) behave asymmetrically: the former excludes the latter but not
vice versa. Yet, the two alternatives are not logically ordered. It is only by virtue
of common knowledge that a college degree entails a high school degree. The
asymmetric behavior of these two alternatives thus seems to mirror their contextual
asymmetric entailment relationship, not their logical independence.
Magri (2009b,a, 2011) submits that the computation of scalar implicatures (as
well as the semantics of overt only) is blind to common knowledge. Schlenker (2012)
objects that Hirschberg’s contextually ordered alternatives (61) defy this assumption,
as their asymmetric behavior seems to require access to their contextual asymmetric
entailment relationship. Schlenker thus replaces contextual Blindness with a more
moderate assumption which I have dubbed contextual Short-sightedness, as it allows
implicatures to retain some contextual sensitivity, hopefully as much as needed to
deal with the contextual ordering of the alternatives in (61). In this paper, I have
shown that Schlenker’s Short-sightedness turns out to be equivalent to Blindness.
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His proposal is therefore a technical mistake that provides no new ammunitions
against the challenge raised by contextually ordered alternatives (61). I have then
taken a closer look at the challenge. I have presented some initial evidence that
cases such as (61) are restricted to specific lexical choices. And I have conjectured
that these lexical choices share the property of yielding a logical ordering which is
congruent with the contextual ordering. Although a thorough investigation of this
conjecture is left to future work, the conjecture opens the possibility that it is not the
contextual ordering but the logical ordering which is driving the asymmetric scalar
behavior in cases such as (61), thus reconciling these cases with Blindness (or the
equivalent Short-sightedness).
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